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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was a criminal 
action brought by the State of Utah 
against Defendant-Appellant Loren 
Craig Sims, charging him wifh the 
crime of Rape in violation of Title 
76, Chapter 53, Section 15, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on the 28th 
day of October, 1971, the jury found 
the defendant guilty of Rape. On 
December 6, 1971, the Defendant 
was sentenced to imprisonment in 
the Utah State Prison for the indeterminat 
terI'l. as provided by law for the 
crime of Rape,said term to be served 
concurrently with his sentence in 
Case No. 23425. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks in the alternative 
an order of this Court reversing 
the verdict and judgment rendered 
at trial and directing the District 
Court to dismiss the case, or in 
the alternative an order of this 
Court reversing the verdict and 
judgment rendered at trial ~~d 
remanding the case to the T~ird 
District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, for a new trial 
consistent with the ruling of this 
Court. 
-1-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Trial of the Defendant for 
the c::-ime ?f R~pe under an infoq 
charging him with violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 53, Section 
15, Utah Code Annotated 1953 , 
commenced on October 20 1971 , , 
at 10:00 a.m. in the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District, Salt Lake County, Stat 
of Utah, the Honorable Gordon 
R. Hall, Judge, sitting with a 
jury. The State of Utah presentei 
its case consisting of testimony 
and evidence summarized as follo1 
1. Pauline Link, the proseetq 
witness, stated that she met Sims 
on Friday December 4, 1970; that, 
he picked her up according to · 
prior arrangements, at a party 
including several people, held 
at 73 S Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Miss Link and the Defend~ 
got in to his truck, drove a hi tel: 
to the University, and then proce 
to J.Ir. Sim's automotive shop 
located at 24 Harvard Avenue, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Miss Link 
said Sims wanted to go there to 
get some wine. She said that she 
recalled that the shop was dark 
when they arrived. She testified 
that Sims unlocked the door, 
which had a padlock on it, went 
in the shop and 2..pparently got 
the wine, and returned to the 
truck (T.85-92). 
I 
-2- _j 
She testified that she and 
Sims drove toward Park City during 
which they had a couple of ~eers, 
and as they got part way up the 
canyon Sims truck malfunctioned 
and stopped. They turned around 
and returned to Sim's shop to 
get another car. She testified 
that-when they approached the 
shop for the second time the 
shop was also dark; (T.93) that 
they went inside and switched 
cars~ She testified that during 
the time they were in the shop 
Sims asked her if she "Hanted 
to ball" and she said no. She 
indicated that Sims made no other 
advances toward her at this 
t~me(T.95). 
She then testified that 
they drove up Millcreek Canyon, 
turned around and came part way 
doHn the canyon at which time 
they stopped the vehicle and parked 
near the side of the road. She 
testified that during this time 
he gave her a "little kiss", 
but that he made no other advances 
toHard her (T.96). She testified 
that they then Hent to the home 
of a friend of Sims by the name 
of Lewis Arnold on Michigan Avenue 
at about 17th East where they 
remained for approximately one-half 
hour, during Hhich time they 
consumed some additional alcohol. 
They then drove to a home which 
11iss Link said was occupied by 
-3-
her boyfriend whose name is "Cor 
at approximately 33rd South an<l 
2nd W~s t. After they had detcrn,
1 
that ner boyfriend was not home 
Sims said that he wanted to ao 
back ~o his shoJ? to ~urn ~he 6 lig1. 
on prior to taking Miss Link horn: 
(T.97). . 
She testified that she was 
in the sixth day of her menstrua: 
period and that she had had no 
sexual intercourse for a period 
of five or six days. She state<l · 
that she was wearing corduroy 
pants, a shirt, and a matching 
corduroy coat (T.99). 
She testified that as they 
approached the shop the shop Has . 
dark but there \vas some residual; 
light. She stated that Sims told! 
her that he was afraid to go intoj 
the shop alone. He got out of \ 
the truck and she said she "belie·. 
he took off the lock from the J 
door" (T .100). She said that \ 
they entered the shop holding I 
hands, Craig slightly in front 
1 
of her, after 1vhich time she passr 
him and proceeded slightly ahe~dl 
of him into the shop. She test1fr 
that as they went toward the ba~ 
of the shop between two automob1h 
she was aware of being struck ' 
in the head with several blows. 
She says that she recalled that 
her watch was broken and that , 
her wrist was bruisecl by the f?rc'.j 
of the blows, and that she uit1mai 
! 
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sank to the floor unconscious 
(T.102)~- She testified that when 
she a1voke her head was throbing , ' tnere was a considerable amount 
of blood, and that her pants had 
been· "pulled dmm". She stated 
that her pants were unbuttoned 
and that there were no tears in 
them. She did however state that 
two buttons were missing at the 
time she regained consciousness 
(T.104). In response to the question 
as to exactly where her pants were, 
she stated that they were not off 
her feet or her legs, but they 
were "down". She also indicated that 
at the time of the incident she 
had had no injuries to her breasts. 
She stated that her clothes 
at the time of the trial were in 
the same condition as they had 
been when they were removed from 
her after the incident, and the 
clothes were admitted into evidence. 
The clothes had stains on them 
which appeared to be blood. States 
Exhibit No. 10, a pair of womens 
panties were admitted into evidence. 
The prosecutrix stated that when 
she had put them on that evening 
they were clean. They did bear 
some dirt and other soil when introduced 
at the trial (T.107). 
Miss Link then testified 
that Sims helped her into a Corvette 
automobile told her they were 
going to g~ to the hospital, and 
drove directly up State Street 
-5-
toward the L.D.S. Hospital. Du
1 
the course of that t rave 1 thev I 
saw two Highway Patrolmen at ~br' 
Eighth South and State Street J1 
Sims stopped his vehicle next' 1 
to the patrolmen, told them that
1 
his shop had been broken into 
that Miss Link 1vas hurt, and thai 
he was taking her to the hospita:f 
They proceeded to the hospital · 
and Miss Link's injuries 1vere : 
treated (T.110). She testified , 
that there was a gash in her sca1( 
and a laceration on the nipple · 
of one breast. A photograuh takr1 
some days later of that wo~md · 
was introduced into evidence. 
She indicated that her heacl was 
stitched (T.113), and that they 
got to the hospital about 2:30 
a.m. She testified that Sims 
had an injury which she "thought 
to be on the left side of his 
neck", and that it was red (T.11~1 
She denied at anytime having 1, 
given consent to Sims to have I 
sexual intercourse with her, ~di 
stated that she was unmarried I 
and that she had never been marrii 
to the Defendant. 
On cross-examination she 
testified that she had initially 
gone out with Sims because h~r 
number had apparently been vven 
to Sims by one Jack Brady, w~om 
she had seen at several parties 
(T.115). She stated that she m 
could not_ recall any of the pers 
who had been at the apartment 
-6-
on S Street when Sims picked her 
up except to say that she recalled 
two persons both of whom were 
from Price, Utah. She could 
disclose no local persons who 
had been at the party (T.117). 
She stated that she knew that other 
persons at the party were residents 
of Salt Lake City but could not 
state there names or indicate their 
whereabouts (T.119). She denied 
any drugs or marajuana were used 
at the party. She indicated that 
she and Sims had got to llr. Arnold's 
apartment at approximately 12 o'clock 
midnight and that the other people 
who subsequently came to that 
apartment arrived at approximately 
12:30 a.m. She denied going to 
any other place but the apartment 
on 2nd West and 33rd South for 
the purpose of finding her boyfriend 
Cory (T.120). She denied that 
she and Sims had discussed having 
sexual intercourse in the canyon. 
She testified to having had some 
beer, wine, and a "white alcohol" 
which Sims had given to her during 
the course of the evening (T.126). 
She was unable to testify to the 
exact route that they had driven 
while in the truck (T.154). She 
testified that there were considerable 
"unrecognizeable objects" laying 
around the floor of the shop, 
and she characterized the shop 
as "messy" (T .15 7). 
2. The State then called 
J.V. Stevenson, M.D., who testifi~d 
that he was admitted to the practice 
-7-
of medicine in the State of Ut~1 
specializing in Obstetrics and 
Gynecology. He testified that 
he did a pelvic examination on 
Pauline Link during the early 
morning hours of December 5, 1971 I 
and found "live sperm in the vaai;,i 
0 LI CT:l62~, ~hich h~ ~estified could i 
mainta~n l ts mot1l1 ty for a period! 
from eight to twelve hours commonli 
and possibly for a period of h.rend 
hours. He testified that at the ' 
time he saw her, her head had been i 
bandaged. 
Dr. Stevenson could not say 
that the intercourse which had 
been responsible for the deposit 
of sperm into the vagina of the 
prosecutrix was force ab le (T .170) 
and does not recall the presence 
of menstrual blood or a tampax 
in the prosecutrix. He stated 
that had such an item been found 
in the pelvic area of the prosecutr 
his notes would have revealed it. 
He testified that there was no 
evidence of tearing or abrasions 
of the external genitalia, and 
that there was no evidence of ery& 
swelling or redness of the vaginal I 
tissue (T.172,173). He stated 
that had the prosecutrix been 
unconscious at the time of penetrat 
there would have been a decrease 
in the amount of lubricating secret! 
in the vagina. He indicated ti1a~­
there was no indicating of a· pol1)t, 
or a denudation of the skin indic~ 
a "dry penetration" and that the 
-8-
prosecutrix had a "perfectly normal 
pelvis" (T.175). He stated that 
during the time of the alleged 
assault, the prosecutrix was between 
the cessation of menstruation and 
ovulation. 
3. The state then called 
Claudia-Boer, the supervisor of 
medical records at the L.D.S. 
Hospital who read a preliminary 
diagnosis of the injuries to Miss 
Link, indicating that she had a 
five inch laceration in the left 
frontal parietal area of the skull 
and a further laceration in the 
occipital periosteum of the skull. 
She further indicated that the 
records indicated that Miss Link 
had a two centimeter laceration 
on the left breast laterally across 
the aureola, (T.188). Miss Boer 
indicated that there was no evidence 
in the record that any sutures 
had been taken on the breast, 
and that the general characterization 
of a laceration as used in the 
medical records would be a ::scratch!: 
or a "cut" (T.197-8). 
4. Miss Link was then recalled 
stand for further cross-examination. 
I1iss Link stated that the door 
may have been left unlocked on 
the second trip back to the shop 
to change cars, inasmuch as she 
did not recall Sims locking the 
door (T.204). She stated that prior 
to entering the shop on the third 
occasion, Sims saicl,"I'm afraid-
-9-
' 
Y?U ~o first" and that she preceel 1 
him into the shop as he held her 
left hand with his right(T.209). 
She stated that she was struck 
approxirna tely four to eight t irnes. 
1 
She said that when she awoke Sims I 
was calling to her from another 1 
part of the shop, and that she 
was in a different place in the 
shop than she had been when strudj 
Sims told her that apparently , 
burglars had been in the shop ! 
when they entered and had as saultell 
them when caught inside the busine 
(T.214). She stated that she 
felt that they had been in the 
shop approximately thirty to forty 
minutes. She stated ~h~t at the 
time Sims pulled up next tu the 
Highway Patrolmen on the way to 
the hospital, Craig gave them 
the address to the shop. She 
claims that at the time that 
occurred she knew that she had 
been raped but did not say anythin; 
to the officers whatever (T. 218). 
She did not recall the exact 
1 ri.,-.,..+..; l""\"1""\ "+ kr.~ ,.....,.n-n+r T.rhr'.:'ll-n C""hr. 
J...V\....CA.f....J..V.LJ. V..L .L.1V.L ..t:-'C-4..J.Ll-.J l'V.l.l\..J.1J. .....JJ.J.V 
awoke, but recalled that they 
were not up around her waist. 
She stated that she wasn't sure 
that Craig had either hit her 
or raped her at the time they 
went to the hospital (T.222). 
She stated that Sims visited the 
hospital, once or twice, brought 
a gift, and that no o~jec~i~n~ 
were made by her to his visiting 
her (T.224). She stated that 
Sims visited her once in her home 
but that she had refused to see 
-10-
l . 
Jllm. 
She admitted that she had 
previously l1ad sex with her boyfriend 
Cory) and denied a statement disclosed 
in the hospital report wherein 
she had been overheard to say that 
she was drunk or on drugs on the 
evening of this occurrance (T.238). 
5. The State then called 
Richard A. Johnson, an officer 
with the Salt Lake City Police 
Department, who testified that 
he got a call indicating a burglary 
in progress at approximately 2:20 
a.m. December 5, 1970. He approached 
the premises at 24 Harvard Avenue 
and noticed that the front door 
was partially open. He indicated 
that he found all the doors and 
windows of the shop secure with 
the exception of the front door 
(T.249), and that he found the 
padlock apparently used to secure 
the front door in a mud puddle 
in front of the shop. He stated 
that he s~w thP TIPfPn~~nt 8t the 
L.D.S. Hospital at approximately 
3:00 a.m. and that he appeared 
to be intoxicated and that there 
was blood on his person. He indicated 
that Sims said his arms hurt and 
that he had been struck, but had 
not lost consciousness (T.259). 
6. Lee Price, also a Salt 
Lake Police Officer, indicated 
that he saw Sims at the hospital 
on the morning of December 5 and 
that his knuckles were slightly 
-11-
---
skinned. He said that when he 
talked to Miss Link at the hospi 
she claimed that she had been 
raped but Sims said that it was 
"impossible" (T. 266). Sims tol<l 
Officer Price that when they 
got to the shop the door was 
open and the light was on, that 
he had gone in turned off the 
light, then went back with Tliss 
Link at which time he was struck 
Price characterized Sjms as · '1 
excited and drunk at the hospital.\ 
7. The State then called 
Keith Stauffer, who was at all 
relevant tim~s an officer of 
the Salt Lake City Police Force, 
who stated that he met Sims on 
December 7, 1970, at the Salt 
Lake City Hall of Justice. 
Stauffer indicated that he had 
a conversation with Sims prior 
to having advised him of his 
rights, during which Sims said 
that when he and Miss Link had 
returned to the shop the door 
1 c c::+"'.:lnrl;'Y\rT """Y'\n"T"'\ "',.....,...1 +hri+ +1 ... ~ ... ., /!2...._... ....... i....\..4.1..a.'-4....L..&..&.fs.,Vt--'"'-'.LJ. (..A...1J.\..l. '-'-1.lUI..- l,.ll.V.Y 
went inside the business and 
that he was struck from behind 
and knocked down. He was also 
aware that Miss Link had been 
knocked down. He said that he 
had been dazed. He said that 
he had heard somebody in the 
shop who he assumed to be burglars 
At this time Officer Stauffe: 
advised him of his right to remaH 
silent and,the other rights 
required by Miranda vs. Arizona 
-12-
(T.277-8). Mr. Stauffer then 
indicated that his conversation 
with Sims "basically came to a 
halt," that Sims reiterated that 
"she could not have been raped." 
"She wasn't out; she wasn't unconscious 
for more than a few minutes; and 
I was only dazed." At this point 
the defense objected to any reference 
to this-conversation on the grounds 
that Sims, after he had been warned 
of his rights under Miranda vs. 
Arizona had refused to waive those 
rights. The defense at that point 
moved for a mistrial based on the 
statement of the officer as to 
conversation which Sims had made 
after his rights had been read. 
The objection to the question was 
over-ruled and the motion for a 
mistrial was denied (T.279). 
Stauffer testified that Sims was 
aggravated at the conversation 
and reached over and ripped the 
notes which Stauffer was writing 
out of his hand and wadded them 
up. Stauffer said that he recovered 
the notes. 
During the testimony of 
Detective Stauffer the defense 
made several objections to the 
subject-matter of the testimony, 
including the fact that Stauffer 
continuinally and persistently 
volunteered information, refused 
to answer the questions responsively 
and appeared to_have_a sens~ of 
duty about getting his version 
of the story in. The manner_ of_ . 
his testimony was highly prejudicial 
-13-
in the view of the defense and 
made a fair trial of the issues 
impossible. i 
I 
At the conclusion of the prosecu:j 
case the defense moved the court 
1 
to dismiss the case on the followinsl 
grounds: I 
1. That the State had not 
established, by the introduction 
I 
: 
of reasonable evidence,-the corpus 
delicti of the crime of rape in 
that there had been no direct 
evidence whatever that the prosecutri' 
had even engaged in sexual intercour~ 1 
with defendant, let alone been 
raped. 
2. The fact that there was 
insufficient evidence that if 
the prosecutrix had been raped 
the act had been committed by 
the defendant to justify sending 
the case to the jury. 
Both of said motions were 
, • , 1 ~ , , _r _ _ _ _ __ -- ~ - ...... ~ ..J ,.... ;J aenieu ana c11e ueie11::.e JJlUL-c:c:ucu 
to present its case which consisted 
of testimony and evidence as 
follows. 
I 
A. Dale Tenney, a Trooper .. 
0
1 
for the Utah Highway Patrol ~estifie 
that on the evening in question 
a red sports car pulled up next 
to him while he was in the course 
of ticketing a motorist. In the 
car were a man and a women; the 
woman was obviously injured and 
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bleeding from the head. At the 
time the car pulled up the window 
of the sports car \11as down and 
the woman was sitting not more 
than two or three feet from the 
officer. The female occupant of 
the car said nothing to him, but 
the male occupant indicated that 
his passengar was injured and asked 
directions to the hospital. There 
was no mentioned made by either 
of the occupants of the sports 
car of a burglary or a rape, nor 
was any explanation as to the 
injuries offered. 
B. Holly Fife testified that 
she was a student nurse working 
at the L.D.S. Hospital, and that 
she was present when Sims and Niss 
Link arrived at the hospital. 
She said that Miss Link did not 
mention having been raped, and 
indicated that she did not want 
Sims to leave the room in which 
she was being treated. Miss Link 
did not make any reference to any 
injury to her breast, or the fact 
that she had buttons missing from 
her jeans (T.253-260) She indicated 
that the attendants at the hospital 
asked whether or not she had been 
raped and she responded that she 
did not remember what had happened 
(T.264). Mr. Sims stayed in the 
hospital most of the night, ~ccompanyed 
Miss Link to x-ray, and was in 
and out of her presence several 
times, during which no strain in 
their relationship appeared. 
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C. Lois Burch, a nurse at 
the L.D.S. Hospital indicated 
that she attended to Niss Link 
the next day. She indicated that 
Miss Link was extremely nervous, 
and that she entered in Miss Link's 
hospital chart the substance of 
a conversation which she overheard 
in which Miss Link stated, "Guess 
what, I was raped 1 as t night" 
and that Miss Link, during that 
conversation, said something about 
"really being on one". 
D. Harold Robinson, a Salt 
Lake City Police Officer, testified 
that he was at the hospital during 
the time Sims was there on the 
evening in question, that Sims 
had blood on his lower forearms 
and shirt and appeared to have 
no wounds on his hands. He stated 
that Sims wrist was swollen and 
that he had a large lump on the 
back section of his head as well 
as considerable puffiness on one 
side of his face. He remarked 
to Sims "You will have a good 
shiner in the morning", in obvious 
reference to the wound on his 
face (T.278-281). 
E. Mary Arnold, the mother 
of Lewis Arnold, testified that 
on December 5, 1970, Craig Sims 
and Pauline Link arrived at her 
home shortly after 12:00 o'clock. 
She indicated that her son Lewis 
and several other individuals 
got home sometime after 1:00, 
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and that Miss Link and Mr. Sims 
remained there until approximately 
1:30 a.m. on December 5, 1970 
(T.293). 
She further stated that she 
saw Craig the next day and that 
his hand was bandaged and he had 
a black and blue spot on the side 
of his face, approximately 2 inches 
long which looked like a blow (T. 
295). She stated that when she 
had observed Miss Link on the 
previous evening "You could tell 
that Miss Link had been drinking 
or taking pills". 
F. Lewis Arnold testified 
that on the evening of December 
5, 1970, he arrived home at approximately 
1:10 a.m.; that Miss Link and Mr. 
Sims were there when he arrived 
and that they left at approximately 
1:30 a.m. He stated that Miss 
Link appeared "half drunk but not 
completely drunk" (T. 304-306). 
He stated that he saw Sims the 
next day, at which time Sims haJ 
a mark from his left eye back to 
his left ear approximately 1 inch 
1vide, that his hand was bandaged 
and his head was black and blue. 
G. The defense then called 
Preston Sims who testified that 
the defendant on the day after 
the alleged rape had a bruise on 
his temple, and that his wrist 
was swollen. He had no scrapes 
or visible injuries on his hands. 
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He also stated that he had· been 
at but not in the defendants shop 
on Harvard Avenue at approximately 
11:00 p.m. on December 4 1970 , ' 
and that the door to the shop 
at that time was locked, the lights 
were off, and defendant's truck 
was inside with the hood up. 
He further testified that on the 
morning after the alleged rape, 
he found a considerable stain 
of blood on the steps near the 
paint room of the defendants shop 
(T.314-16, 329-30). 
H. Mrs. Eugene Link, mother 
of the prosecutrix, testified 
that she saw Sims at the hospital I 
during the early morning of December~ 
5. She said that her husband 1 
called the police who investigated 
the injury that her daughter had 
received. She further stated 
that Sims visited the hospital 
in the morning, that he came to 
their home twice after Pauline 
Link was released from the hospital 
and that on the first time he 
visited the home he brought a 
gift. 
Due to the recalcitrance of 
this witness the defense requested 
that she be declared an adverse 
witness during further questioning. 
The court refused this motion; 
whereupon the questioning of this 
witness was terminated. 
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I. The defense then called 
Raymond Brady. The individual 
\vho had given Sims 1liss Link's 
telephone number. He stated that 
he had met Miss Link at a Halloween 
Party during October of 1971 that 
they had talked together, sm;ked 
some marijuana, and that he had 
engaged in some reasonably intimate 
physical contact with the prosecutrix 
having only met her for a few hours 
(T.341-342). At this time the 
District Attorney objected to the 
line of questioning on the grounds 
that it was irrelevant and the 
court sustained the objection. 
The defense, out of the presence 
of a jury, argued that in a rape 
case the character of the prosecutrix 
was in question, that the defense 
was entitled to examine into her 
propensity to engage in sexual 
intercourse, not only to establish 
her credibility but to determine 
the likelihood that the defendant 
had been required to engage in 
physical force in order to encourage 
the prosecutrix to engage in sexual 
intercourse with him. 
The defense proffer was that 
Mr. Brady's testimony 'vould indicate 
that Miss Link was of a character 
that would not require the use 
of force to get her to submit to 
sexual intercourse, all of which 
would go to her credibility in 
alleging that defendant had raped 
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her as well as reveal something 
about his state of mind after 
having been with her for the 
length of time that Sims had 
on the evening of December 4. 
The court ruled against the 
defense and refused to permit 
the introduction of that evidence. 
J. Mrs. Charlene Patterson 
was then called and testified 
that she had gone out with Sims 
on several occasions socially 
and that he had driven her by 
to check his shop while on the 
dates. This evidence was introducteu 
to rebut the inference laid by 
the state that Sims going to 
the shop had been mere ploy to 
get Miss Link into a physical 
circumstance which would be 
conducive to the act of rape 
(T.343). 
K. Frank Casper, an expert 
locksmith was called for the 
purpose of establishing that 
the kin<l of lock on Sims shop 
would be subject to opening very 
easily by a burglar, and that 
it could be opened either with 
a key or with a pry bar wit~out 
damaging the lock or rendering 
it inoperable (T. 346-350). 
L. The defense then recalled 
Pauline Link to the stand. She 
was then carefully interrogated 
about her actions on the evening 
of December 4. She did not recall 
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any of the route on which she 
and Sims had driven after the 
party in-search for her boyfriend 
(T.354). She testified that the 
clothing which had been removed 
from her at the hospital was not 
given to the Salt Lake City Police 
Department·until sometime later 
at her home. She stated that the 
panties she-had been wearing had 
been clean when she put them on 
on the evening of December 4. She 
did not recall seeing the clothes 
at the hospital. She stated that 
her clothing had apparently been 
taken home in a paper sack, but 
that the first time she saw the 
clothing worn on the evening in 
question the items were piled on 
a table not in any kind of container 
in the basement of her home (T.367,375-378). 
She indicated that she thought the 
clothes were in the same condition 
at trial as they had been at the 
hospital but does not recall having 
seen .any blood on her panties when 
the clothes were removed from her 
at the hospital (T.382-384). 
Her answers to most of these 
questions were very vague and evasive 
culminated by her saying " I don't 
remember any answers to the questions 
you have been asking" (T.373). 
Finally, she stated that ~he ~ad 
noticed no irritation or itching 
to any part of her body. This question 
was put to the prosecutrix due to 
information provided by Defendant 
and his brother that the shop of 
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the defendant was covered with 
a fiberglass sanding dust which 
when it touches the skin ~auses 
inflammation and itching. 
M. The defense then called 
the defendant, Loren Craig Sims. 
He reiterated a good many of the 
events related by the prosecutrix 
as they had occurred on the evening 
of December 4, 1970 and the early 
morning hours of December 5, 
1970, but related the following 
details and other events which 
the defense alleges are significant. 
First, Sims indicated that 
when he picked up Miss Link at 
73 S Street, Miss Link asked him 
whether he had any marijuana and 
when he replied "no" she suggested 
that they get drunk. He stated 
that when he picked her up the 
individuals at the party, including 
the prosecutrix were rolling 
and smoking what appeared to be 
a marijuana cigarette. He stated 
that Miss Link left the premises 
at 73 S Street with a marijuana 
cigarette and that she and the 
hitchhiker they picked up on the 
way to the University of Utah 
were smoking this cigarette in .. 
his truck (T. 85-87). Sims testified 
that his reasons for being concerned. 
for the security of his business 
was the fact that he had had two 
prior burglaries and that he wanted 
to be sure the shop was locked 
up as was his .habit (T. 90). In 
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Hddition to picking up a bottle 
of wine at his shop, he picked up 
two six packs of 16oz. beer. He 
testified that lliss Link had been 
drinking wine as well as a mixture 
of beer and everclear of which he 
had a bottle in his glove compartment. 
He said that Miss Link requested 
that he stop several times at service 
station restrooms (T.93,103). Sims 
testified that after they had gone 
to the party at Lewis Arnolds, they 
left his home at approximately 
1:30-1:45 a.m. He indicated that 
Miss Link asked him to see if he 
could find her boyfriend and they 
took a drive from Arnolds house 
on Hichigan Avenue and approximately 
17th East-to 3rd East and 21st South, 
and from there to 33rd South and 
2nd West. From there they went 
to Kensington Avenue at approximately 
13th East from which point they 
went to Sim's shop. Sims brother, 
Preston, testified that he had taken 
a similar drive after the evening 
in question and that the elapsed 
time,obeying the speed limit, was 
approximately 40 minutes. Sims 
testified that when they reached 
his shop they pulled up and the 
lights were out. The door was ajar 
and Sims said to liiss Link,"I'll 
go in, see whats missing, and call 
the Police". As Sims approached, 
Miss Link got out of the car ~nd 
joined him , taking hold of his 
right hand (T.111). He stated that 
he did not recall seeing the lock 
on the door. As they entered the 
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shop Miss Link was slightlf ahead 
of him, but he left her and proceeded 
toward the rear of the shop to 
turn on the light . As he got 
to the wall and reached for the 
switch he was struck in the head. 
He said that everything went 
black but he doesn't think that 
he lost consciousness (T.113). 
Upon regaining his senses he said 
that he heard crying or whimpering 
and found Miss Link lying on the 
floor some distance away near 
the door to the paint room. He 
stated that during he was aware 
of some kind of movement or motion 
around him, but was unable to 
see anything (T.116). He stated 
that Miss Link stated that her 
head hurt but that he could not 
tell how badly she was injured. 
He said that Miss Link asked him 
" Did they hurt you bad" and that 
he replied that he was allright. 
By this time they had walked across 
the shop to the door and he could 
see in the outside light that 
blood was running down her face, 
whereupon he told her that he 
would take her to the hospital 
(T.119-20). He said that the 
word burglars was not used during 
the conversation and denied that 
Miss Link had said she thought 
Sims had hit her. He stated that ' 
as he saw her regaining consciousness! 
she did not do anything with her ! 
clothing. He said that they got 
in the car pulled on to State Str~et, an~ approached the Highway 
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Patrolmen for directions to the 
hospital. His testimony about 
the incident with the patrolman 
largely corroborated the statements 
of Dale Tenney, with the addition 
that questions were asked which 
indicated that Miss Link could 
easily have gotten out of the 
Corvette automobile without 
difficulty because of the protection 
afforded by the center console 
of the automobile from Sims. 
Sims testified that when they 
reached the hospital he did what 
he could to secure help for her 
and further indicated that Miss 
Link did not want him to leave 
her presence (T.125). He testified 
that his wrist was stiff and that 
he had some blood on his head. 
He said that he heard nothing 
about an allegation of a sexual 
attack for several days (T.126). 
At that time, he heard the allegation 
from Detective Stauffer. He stated 
that he saw Miss Link at the x-ray 
division of the hospital and that 
he went to see her the next morning 
during visiting hours. He did 
not talk to Lina but only her 
mother, who thanked him for being 
so considerate and staying with 
Lina the night before (T.128). 
He again visited the hospital 
on Sunday evening in the company 
of several other people, including 
Miss Link's boyfriend Cory . . 
He said that he had a conversation 
with her at that time during which 
she made no mention of any sexual 
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attack. He said he saw her again 
at the hospital, gave her a gift, 
and engaged in a short conversation ' 
with her. During that occasion 
he denied that she had asked 
him to leave or mentioned anything 
about a sexual attack (T.130). 
The next day he went to her home 
at which time Mrs. Link invited 
him in. He said that he talked 
to Pauline Link from the doorway 
but her mother said that she 
wasn't dressed and was resting 
so he left, intending to come 
back later. He denied that during 
this visit anything was said 
about a sexual attack. During 
the end of the same week he went 
again to the house and Mrs. Link 
told him that Pauline was sleeping. 
This visit was apparently after 
Detective Stauffer had talked 
to both Miss Link and Mr. Sims 
(T.131). He stated that on one 
of his previous visits he had 
had a conversation with Miss 
Link about the visits of the 
police, in which she said that 
she wished " she could get them 
to quit bothering her" . She 
said she didn't know what they 
wanted with her and why they 
kept bothering her (T.132). Sims 
stated that Miss Link had never 
told him that her pants had been 
pulled down during the evening 
in question (T.153). 
the 
At T.156, over defense objection,i 
District Attorney required j 
I 
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Sims to shoH his hands to the 
jury and to clench a fist. Also, 
on cross-examination, Sims denied 
having ever told anyone that he 
had raped Miss Link. He corroborated 
the testimony of his brother that 
when the kind of fiberglass dust 
all over the bottom of the shop 
comes in contact with the skin, 
it causes itching and sometimes 
will cause a rash. 
The prosecution on rebuttal 
called Robert Allan Yockey, who 
testified that he had been an 
inmate in the Salt Lake County 
Jail during a considerable period 
of time when Sims was incarcerated 
there awaiting trial. In response 
to patently leading questions, 
permitted by the court over objection, 
he affirmed that Sims had told 
him that he took Miss Link to 
his shop, that he knocked her 
unconscious, and that during the 
time she was unconscious he raped 
her; that after he raped her he 
laid down beside her and pretended 
that they had been assaulted by 
burglars. 
The special attention of . . 
the court is called to the cross-exam1nat1on 
of this witness commencing at 
T.179 during which this witness 
all b~t destroyed any claim that 
he might have that his testimony 
was credible.He said that Sims 
told him that he had called the 
police immediately after he noticed 
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the girl lying there with the 
bottom of her clothes off denied 
Sims ever said he took he; to 
the hospital and indicated that 
Sims had said he had set up the 
door to look like a buralarly 
b ' apparently before he and the girl 
returned to the shop. He indicated 
that Sims said he had sprained 
his ankle during the course of 
the rape and indicated that Sims 
may have said that the girl got 
a broken leg during the attack 
(T.183). He indicated that he 
had not said anything to anybody 
about this conversation for a 
considerable period of time after 
the conversation had occurred 
(T.184-185). 
At T.189 Yockey testified 
as to the substance of the conversatid 
he had with Jay Edmonds,most of 
which was subsequently rebutted 
by the testimony of Jay Edmonds 
(T.207). 
On surrebuttal the defense 
called Mark Richmond, also an 
inmate in the Salt.Lake County 
Jail during the tiilie in which 
the alleged incriminating statements• 
related by Yockey were supposed · 
to have been made by Sims. Richmond 
testified that he had been one 
cell· away from Sims during the 
period in question and that as 
a habit he never went to sleep 
before 2:00 o'clock a.m. because 
he had had a special 1 igh t installed 
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in his cell permitting him to 
read late into the night. He 
testified that had such a conversation 
as related by Yockey and Sims 
occurred, he would have heard 
it and to his knowledge there 
had never been anything said by 
Sims comporting to the substance 
of the conversation related by 
Yockey. 
Also on surrebuttal, the 
defense called Gary Phelps, who 
had been an inmate of the Salt 
Lake County Jail during the same 
period of time. He testified that 
Sims had told him about the affair, 
indicated that he and Miss Link 
had been beat up and that he took 
her to the hospital, and implied 
that the police were trying to 
.d make something up about what 
happened during the period when 
Miss Link was knocked out (T.156). 
He said that Sims had never told 
him or anybody else in his hearing 
that he had raped or assaulted 
Miss Link. He also testified 
that Yockey had asked him whether 
"some people can get released 
from jail if they made a deal 
if they tell about something 
another person has done" and that 
a jailor had said that if you 
want to tell on somebody he could 
put him in touch with the people 
to tell (T.158). He also stated 
that during this conversation 
Yockey had mentioned the name 
of Craig Sims. Phelps further 
stated that he was with Yockey 
every night during the period 
i~ question and that during that 
time Yockey had not had any conversat1 
with Sims of the substance related 
to the court by Yockey (T.237). 
After argument, the jury was 
charged and retired to deliberate. 
The jury returned at 6:58 p.m. 
and found the defendant guilty 
of the crime of rape as charged 
in the information. 
The defense excepted to of 
the courts instructions as shall 
be hereinafter further setforth 
(T.242). 
ARGm.IENT 
I 
THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH DEFENDAITT 
WAS CONVICTED IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT FOR TWO 
REASONS: 
A. THE EVIDENCE OF THE CORPUS 
DELICTI OF THE CRIME· OF RAPE IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE 
FACT OF THE CRIME BEYOND A REASONABLl 
DOUBT. 
Appellant asserts that the~e 
are certain evidentiary anomalies 
both in the testimony of the 
prosecutrix and others which 
require recognition of a reasonable 
doubt that the crime of rape was 
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committed on the evening of December 
4th· or the early morning of December 
5, 1970 against Pauline Link. 
First is a serious problem 
which arises out of the time elements 
as they were stated by the witnesses 
at trial. Lewis Arnold, his mother 
Mary Arnold, Mrs. Twelves, and 
Craig Sims, all testified that 
Sims and Miss Link left the home 
of Lewis Arnold sometime between 
1:25 and 1:35 a.m. on the morning 
of December 5, 1970. The uncontroverted 
testimony of Trooper Dale Tenney 
indicated that Sims flagged him 
down at approximately 8th South 
and State Street at 2:05 a.m. on 
December 5, 1970, a period of at 
most 40 minutes after the defendant 
and Miss Link had left the home 
of Mr. Arnold. Miss Link acknowledged 
that she and Sims had driven to 
33rd South and West Temple in an 
effort to find Miss Link's boyfriend 
in that interim. Sims testified 
that they had stopped at 21st South 
and 3rd East, then gone to 33rd 
South and West Temple, and then 
returned to somewhere in the neighborhood 
of Kensington Avenue and 13th East 
also during the same period of 
time before they returned to his 
shop. Sims brother testified that 
at the speed limit, this d~ive . 
took almost 40 minutes. Miss Link 
was carefully cross -examined about 
these other stops, but did not 
recall them. Attention is called 
to the vagueness of her testimony 
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and her inability to even recall 
the routes they travelled 
on that evening, all of which can 
only support the conclusion that 
her recollection is not nearly 
so sound as Sims'. The long and 
short of this is that if there 
were only 40 minutes available 
from the time Miss· Link and Sims 
left Mr. Arnold's house and the 
time they flagged over Trooper 
Tenney, and they had spent 40 
minutes driving around, there 
would have been no time left during 
that interim for Sims- to accomplish 
a forceable rape upon Miss Link. 
Her testimony that she was knocked 
unconscious for 30 or 40 minutes 
is obviously untenable in light 
of this time factor. Even so, 
it would appear impossible for 
Sims to have hit Miss Link in 
the head, removed her trousers 
and underpants, committed forceable 
rape on her, put her underpants 
and trousers on and pulled them 
partially up, feigned being unconscio~1 
himself, antl got out of the sh?P 1[ 
in time to meet the 2:05 deadline I 
testified to by Officer Tenney. 
In light of all the foregoing, 
there is certain a reasonable 
doubt that during that period 
of time any act of intercourse . 
was accomplished with the prosecutnx 
by the defendant. 
I 
I 
I 
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Further attention is called 
to the allegations of Mr. Sims 
regarding the conduct of the 
prosecutrix at the time he picked 
her up at the party at 73 S Street. 
He indicated unequivocally that 
Miss Link was smoking marijuana 
and during the course of the 
evening she became somewhat drunk. 
Her singular inability to come 
up with any corroboration whatever 
for her portion of the story 
tends to cast substantial doubt 
about its veracity. Her refusual 
to disclose the names of any 
persons at the party is highly 
significant, particularly in light 
of the fact that the form of the 
questions and her answers indicate 
that she had to know their names. 
Her inability to recall the time 
sequence or the routes driven 
by she and the defendant so as 
to establish the time sequence 
more adequately tends to indicate 
either a drunkeness which exceeds 
that demonstrated by the record 
or a refusal to come forward with 
the whole tr~th. Her vagueness 
in answering questions as to the 
sequence of events at the hospital 
is significant. At bottom, the 
prosecutrix came forth with no 
direct evidence whatever that 
Sims had committed the crime of 
rape on her, ?r that such ~ crime 
iv as ever comm1 tted. She simply 
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permitted, by her refusal to 
testify and make available evidence 
of the true facts, a theory of 
the state based wholly on circums tanfr 
evidence, none of which, by reason 1 
of her refusal to disclose the 
facts, was subject to corroboration 
1 
to go to the jury and result in , · 
a verdict of guilty. There is 
no justification permitting such 
an unsupported theory of guilt, 
together with a refusal to clarify 
those portions of the theory which 
were subject to easy corroboration, 
to result in the imprisonment 
of the appellant. 
A third inconsistency in the 
testimony is the assertion of 
the prosecutrix that she was, 
on December 5, 1970, in the 6th 
day of menstruation, and that 
she was wearing a tampax on that 
evening. The testimony of Dr. 
Stevenson was that he did not 
recall the presence of menstrual 
blood or a tampax in the prosecutrix 
(T.170), and that had such been 
the case he would have made notes 
of it. He further testified that 
during a period of unconsciousness 
there would be a decrease in the 
amount of vaginal lubrication . 
which would tend to cause a denudation 
or polishing of the skin upon 
penetration. No such evidence 
was found by the doctor. On the 
contrary he testified that she 
had a "perfectly normal pelvis" 
(T.175). This conflict i~ the 
testimony raises a question as 
' 
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to the motive of Miss Link in 
lying about such inconsequential 
factors. Defendant alleges that 
the most logical explanation for 
the conflict is that Miss Link 
had in fact engaged in sexual 
intercourse with somebody other 
than the defendant within a day 
or two of the 5th of December 
1970, and that she desired to 
hide that fact from the jury and 
the spectators in the courtroom, 
including her parents. 
Of further significance 
is the recalcitrance of the prosecutrix 
to disclose the name or whereabouts 
of her boyfriend "Cory". She 
refused to disclose his identity 
to the defense prior to trial, 
and only after she was ordered 
to do so by the court did she 
disclose his identity at trial. 
At this point, it was too late 
to locate this man, who the defense 
asserts is the most likely person 
to corroborate. her statement that 
she had had no intercourse within 
a period of 24 hours. Her recalcitrance 
to supply this information can 
only lead to the conclusion that 
she was afraid his testimony would 
contradict hers with the result 
that the corpus delicti of the 
crime of rape would remain unproven. 
The long and short of this 
is that the only evidence of rape 
is the evidence that live sperm 
was found in the vagina of the 
prosecutrix on the morning of 
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December 5, 1970, coupled with 
her testimony that she had not 
engaged in sexual intercourse 
within a period of 24 hours of 
the time of the pelvic examination. 
Given the inconsistencies in her i 
testimony and her refusal to j 
disclose facts which would tend , 
to ~hr<?w light on those inconsistenciel 
a finding that the crime of rape 
occurred here does not comport I 
with the requirements of due I 
process as set forth in the : 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Cons ti tutii: 
of the United States. The finding 
is wholly circumstantial and 
obviously ignores the quality 
of the testimony on which it is 
based. 
B. THE EVIDENCE TENDING TO 
ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT COl'vlMITTED 
THE CRIME OF RAPE, IF INDEED IT 
OCCURRED, IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF GUILTY. 
In addition to the facts stated 
in part A above indicating that 
the crime itself was not committed, 
the following further items create 
a "reasonable doubt" under the 
instructions of the court, that 
defendant committed the crime. 
1. The actions of the appellant 
during the course of the evening 
after the alleged rape occurred 
do not demonstrate any consciousness 
of guilt whatev~r, but indicate 
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that he had no consciousness whatever 
that any crime beside an assault 
by unknown assailants had occurred 
against he and the prosecutrix. 
First is his action immediately 
after removing the prosecutrix 
from his shop and putting her in 
the car. The proposition that 
a man who had just forceably raped 
a woman would pull up next to a 
Highway Patrolman on a public 
street, with his victim sitting 
in a car constructed in a manner 
which would prohibit him from 
stopping her if she wanted to get 
out, so that she was immediately 
adjacent to an Officer of the Law, 
and ask directions to the hospital 
is utterly preposterous. The last 
thing that a rapist would do with 
his victim is take her to the 
police. Of further significance 
is the fact that even though Miss 
Link had every opportunity to 
disclose her knowledge of the crime 
of rape or her suspicions that 
Sims had assaulted her one way 
or another to the trooper, and 
that she failed to do so, indicates 
that the proposition of a forceable 
rape had crossed neither of their 
minds at a point some moments after 
they left the shop. It is certainly 
inconceivable that a woman who 
had just been raped in the manner 
that Miss Link is alleged to have 
been raped, would sit idly by, 
saying nothing, two feet from a 
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policeman, while still in the 
company of her assailant. If 
she had been conscious of being 
raped, and had any suspicion 
that Sims had done it, one would 
suppose her fears about the 
disposition he would make of 
her due to that knowledue would 
b 
compel her to make some effort 
to get away from him or disclose 
her suspicions. All of this 
lends credence to the propositions 
set forth by the defense that 
the allegation of rape did not 
originate in the mind of Miss 
Link, but was implanted there 
by the hospital personnel and 
officers and permitted to grow 
by her so that she could avoid 
disclosure that she had committed 
sexual intercourse with her 
boyfriend. This proposition 
is further strengthened by the 
fact that she said not word 
one about rape until after the 
early morning hours of the 5th 
when Dr. Stevenson approached 
her and requested permission 
to perform a pelvic examination 
upon her. Her actions are consistent 
with the assertion but that she 
had had sexual intercourse with 
her boyfriend within the period 
immediately prior to her admittance 
to the hospital, and that she 
had no concern about that fact 
until the proposition of rape 
was raised by hospital personnel. 
When informed that they wanted 
her to undergo a pelvic examination 
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which she knew would disclose that 
she had had sexual intercourse 
' she , though not making any statements 
directly implicating the defendant 
merely permitted the assumption ' 
that Sims was guilty of the crime 
to grow. She likely assumed that 
no case could be made against the 
defendant by reason of the truth 
of his allegations about the attack 
having originated with unknown 
assailants, which would permit 
her to not do anything tc rebut 
the train of thought of the police 
on the assumption that in no event 
would it cause harm to the defendant. 
All of the fore going is also supported 
by the proposition that she did 
' not remonstrate against Sims presence 
, with her at the hospital, and her 
lack of hostility towards him on 
1 the several subsequent visits 
which he paid to her both at home 
and at the hospital. The proposition 
that a woman who had any consciousness 
or belief that a man had forceably 
raped her would permit him to visit 
, 1vi th her both in the hospital and 
in her home is preposterous. 
Another factual problem is 
raised by her refusal to specify 
what she meant that her pants were 
11 down" . If she knew that they 
were down she must have known how 
far they were down when she pulled 
them up. To think that she could 
. state that they were down over 
1 her buttocks but not go any further, 
strikes the writer as ridiculous. 
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Furthermore, the testimony of 
Sims and his brother that the 
shop_was covered with a layer 
of fiberglass dust which causes 
a severe reaction to the skin 
would indicate that her pants 
were not down sufficiently to 
permit contact with her bare skin 
to the floor~ Otherwise she would 
have been conscious at least of 
some itching. No such testimony 
is found in the record. 
Of further significance is 
the fact that the prosecutrix 
said that some buttons were off 
her pants. No buttons were found 
in the shop or in the vehicle 
of the defendant. This raises 
a questions as to where the items, 
if they were removed from the 
prosecutrix during the course 
of an attack, went. The inadequate 
handling of her clothing, as shall 
be hereinafter setforth, raises 
substantial question about the 
probative value of her testimony 
that buttons were missing from 
her trousers. 
The defense asserts that Miss . 
Link's defensiveness and refusal . ' 
to say anything directly incr~minatin~ 
about Sims arises from her guilty. 
knowledge that the whole prosecut1~ 
arose out of her permitting an 
inference to arise which was not 
true. I~ Sims. had struck ~er .· . d 
six or eight times as she Lest1f1e ' 
the likelihood that she would 
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have turned at least to be conscious 
of the fact that he struck her is 
so great as to render her refusal 
to implicate him directly a severe 
challenge to her credibility. 
The facts indicate that we simply 
have here a girl who solved a personal 
problem by permitting others to 
weave a false inference from perverted 
facts which has now resulted in 
the conviction of the appellant. 
Taken as a whole, Sims' 
recollections as to the events of 
that evening are entirely more 
consistent with the corroborated 
facts than Miss Links', and are 
certainly so pursuasive as to create, 
as a matter of law, a reasonable 
doubt both about the corpus delicti 
of the offense and Sims implication 
in it. 
Although the courts are generally 
reticent to overturn the facts found 
by juries, such action is the duty 
of courts when it is apparent that 
the objective standards contained in 
the instructions to the jury have 
not been complied with in the fact 
finding process. See e.g., United 
States· vs. Corso, 439 F.2d 956. In 
the instant case, the court instructed 
the jury as fallows: 
17. To warrant you in 
convictina the defendant, the evidence 
must to y~ur minds, exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis other than that 
of the guilt of the defendant. 
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That is to say if after an eritire 
cons ider~tion ~nd comparison of ~111 
the testimony in the case, you ca;:l-, 
reasonably explain the· facts aiven 
in evidence on- any reasonablebground 
other than the guilt- of the defendant 
you should acquit him. (emphasis ' 
added) 
In fact, the Arizona Supreme Court 
has held that failure to give an 
"al te rna ti ve- reason ab le hypothesis" 
instruction is error. State vs. 
Valenzuela, 425 P.2d 127. The Flori~ 
Supreme Court in Reynolds· vs. State, 
186 So.2d 315, has said that 
"where the evidence is wholly 
circumstantial and does not exclude 
all reasonable inferences of 
innocence it is· insufficient 11 • 
The Utah Supreme Court in State 
vs. Gutheil, 98 U. 205, 98 P. 2d 
9 4 3 said "A criminal case requires ' . . 
proof of each element of the crime 
by evidence that convinces one 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
existence of each such element. 
In this case, neither the corpus 
delicti of the crime nor the 
defendants' guilt thereof were 
supported by evidence meeting th~ 
criteria set forth in the foregoing 
cases. 
To the instant· case· the following 
language quoted from U.S. vs. 
Buflino,, 285 F.2d 408, (CA 2 
1960) is applicable. 
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A prosecution framed on such 
a doubtful basis should never 
lnve been initiated or allowed 
to proceed so far. For in 
America we still respect 
the dignity of the individual 
anl even an unsavory character 
is not to be imprisoned except 
on definite proof of a specific 
crime. And nothing in criminal 
law administration suggests 
or justifies sharp relaxation 
of traditional standards. 
In this case the court property 
instructed the jury as follows: 
20. You are instructed that 
the charge of rape, is in 
its nature, a most heinous 
on~ likely to create a strong 
prejudice against the accused. 
It is a charge easy to make 
and hard to disprove 
To permit one to be imprisoned 
when the above quoted instruction 
is so squarely in point, upon a 
mishmash of such uncorroborated, 
confusing, weak, inferential, and 
contradictory circumstantial evidence 
as that set forth in this case 
violates the very fundamentals of 
the precepts of fairness upon which 
our judicial system is based, and 
should therefore not be permitted 
to go unchecked. To permit this 
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verdict to stand under the 
foregoing circumstances 
constitutes a violation of the 
fundamentals of due process 
insured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States. 
II 
THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT 
TO GRANT DEFENDAl~TS MOTION FOR 
CHANGE OF VENUE WAS REVERSABLE 
ERROR. 
Courts have long recognized 
an internal conflict in both the 
language of the Sixth Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United 
States and Article 1 Section 12 
of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah, pro vi ding that in criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to a trial by 
an impartial jury in the County 
and District in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, 
by reason of the fact that sometimes 
local prejudice existing in that 
District makes an impartial trial 
impossible. In recognition of 
this conflict the legislature 
of the State of Utah has provided 
for the removal of criminal actions 
upon the ground that a fair and 
impartial trial cannot be h~ld 
in the County where the action 
is pending. Section 77-26-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. In 
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light of this problem appellant 
urges this court to reasses its 
recent reluctance to overturn 
District Court refusals to grant 
defense motion for change of 
venue and to revert to the position 
stated by this court through 
Justice Wade in State v. BeBee, 
110 Utah 484,175 P.2d 478: 
... it certainly would not 
have been unfair for the 
court to have granted a 
change of venue, and we 
are in opinion that it 
would have been better if 
the trial court had granted 
the change under the circumstances 
of this case for their were 
inflammatory news comments ... 
(175 P.2d 481). 
This language raises what 
may be the most pursuasive argument 
in favor of granting defense motions 
for change of venue; that is that 
in a criminal case, the defendant 
ought to be entitled to the fairest 
possible trial which can be reasonably 
given to him, for to do less 
is to deny him the due process 
of law to which he is entitled. 
The Supreme Court has spoken 
several times on the propriety 
of granting defense motions for 
change of venue: Irving v. Dowd, _ 
366 U.S. 717, Shepherd v. MaX\vell 
384 U.S. 344, Marshall v. U.S. 
360 U.S. 310. 
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Perhaps the best statement 
of the Supreme Courts' position 
is found in Irving v. Dowd, supra. 
Here, the buildup of prejudice 
is clear and convincing. 
An examination of the then 
current community pattern 
of thought as indicated by 
the popular news media is 
singularly revealing ... A 
reading of the 46 exhibits 
which petitioner attached 
to his motion indicates that 
a barrage of newspaper headlines, 
articles, cartoons and pictures 
was unleashed against him 
during the six or seven months 
preceeding his trial. The 
motion further alleges that 
the newspapers in which the 
stories appeared were delivered 
regularly to approximately 
95% of the residences in Gibson 
County .•. These stories reveal 
the details of his background, 
including a reference to crimes 
committed when a juvenile .... 
It cannot be gainsayed 
that the force of this adverse 
publicity caused a sustained 
excitement and fostered a 
strong prejudice among the 
people of Gibson County. 
An examination of the press 
notations submitted upon the 
records of this case together with 
those about the same defendant in a 
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case closely related in time and 
substance to the instant case, 
which case is presently before 
this court as Docket No.12244 
will reveal the same reflection 
of public sentiment. Of particular 
impact are editorial statements 
made by local papers about not 
only this defendant but the general 
system of court procedure which 
resulted in his being granted a 
new trial for the crime of murder. 
When community prejudice is as 
high as that reflected in this 
editorial, to permit trial in the 
jurisdiction where the ~bject press 
releases have the greatest currency 
is to deny defendant the "best 
trial which can reasonably be given 
to him", and to violate the due 
processes of the law as they are 
guaranteed to him to by Constitution 
of the United States. 
The following are State 
Court cases containing what appellant 
asserts to be a more appropriate 
~pellate posture on this question. 
State v. BeBee, supra; Forsythe 
v. St ate , 410 Ohio 2 d 10 4 , 2 3 0 N • E • 
2d 611; Juelich v. U.S., 214 F.2d 
950 (CA7, 1954); State v. Canada, 
48 Iowa 440, 164 N. W. 794; State 
~Thompson, 226 Minn. 385,123 
N.\V. 378; State v. Bruman, 127 
llont.579, 269 P.2d 796; People 
v. Leadeche; 258 N. W. 115; People 
v. Fernadez, 89 N.W. 2d 421; Rogers 
Qtate, 236 S.W. 2d 141. 
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Particular attention is called 
to the language of Forsythe , 
supra where in the Supreme Court 
of Ohio stated: 
Where there is reasonable 
likelihood that prejudicial 
news prior to trial will 
prevent fair trial, and postponing 
the trial will not remove 
the threat, the Judge should 
remove the case to another 
County not so permeated with 
publicity (emphasis added). 
The fact that the articles 
published about Sims during 1971, 
all related him to the offense 
of felony murder as well as the 
offense charged in the instant 
case simply adds weight to his 
claim that a removal of the trial 
should have been granted. The 
temper of the community about 
these cases was simply not conducive 
to the conduct of a fair trial. 
The evidence, inconclusive as 
it may be, that certain jurors 
knew about the case prior to their 
sitting as jurors in the trial 
further demonstrates the' proposition 
that the public temper about these 
actions may well have been so 
great as to vitiate the complete 
integrity of the jury and permit 
it to draw inferences from the 
press which are impermissable 
under our system of jurisprudence. 
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By reason of the foregoing 
appellant asserts that his conviction 
should be reversed, and if remanded 
for new trial, that said cause 
should be held in a County other 
than Salt Lake County. 
III 
THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT 
TO GRANT DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DEPOSE 
THE PROSECUTING WITNESS PRIOR TO 
TRIAL DENIED DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW. 
Pivotal to the defense of the 
instant case was complete exploration 
of the evidence of the corpus 
delicti of the crime. After the 
preliminary hearing the defense, 
through investigative work, determined 
that Miss Link had a boyfriend 
with whom, according to the evidence 
turned up in investigation, the 
prosecuting witness may well have 
regularly engaged in sexual intercourse. 
At the time of preliminary hearing, 
as well as at trial, the State's 
evidence of the fact of the crime 
of rape depended upon the finding 
of live sperm inside of the prosecuting 
Witness on the morning of December 
S, 1971 coupled with her denial 
that she had had sexual intercourse 
within the 24 hour period immediately 
prior to the pelvic examination. 
The court found this evidence 
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sufficient to send the case to 
the jury, which returned a verdict 
of guilty. The difficulty with 
the whole series of events is 
that the defense was denied the 
opportunity to investigate the 
credibility of the statement of 
the prosecuting witness that she 
had not engaged in sexual intercourse 
within 24 hours prior to the time 
of her pelvic examination by Dr. 
Stevenson by obtaining from her 
the identity of her boyfriend,whom 
the defense viewed to be the most 
likely candidate to throw additional 
light on her statement. 
In light of this problem, 
and in light of two refusals of 
the prosecuting witness to conduct 
a rational discussion with defense 
counsel about anything to do with 
the case, the defense by proper 
motion moved the court to order 
a deposition of the prosecuting 
witness, in the presence of the 
County Attorney, so this matter 
could be more fully explored and 
so that an opportunity would be 
had to determine the identity 
of Miss Link's boyfriend. 
This motion, filed on May 
18, 1971 was denied, with the 
result that the identity of the 
boyfriend of the prosecuting ' 
witness was not learned by the 
defense until the time of trial, 
at which it was far too late to 
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locate him in time to obtain the 
answers to the questions desired 
to be put to him. 
Of further significance is 
the fact that the prosecuting 
witness, in declining to discuss 
the case with defense counsel, 
indicated that the reason she 
refused to hold such a discussion 
was that she had been instructed 
not to discuss the case with the 
defense by Keith Stauffer, then 
an Officer of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department. The result 
of this course of events is that 
the defense was denied access 
to key evidence which it is believed 
by the defendant would have rebutted 
the evidence adduced by the State 
to establish the corpus delicti 
of the crime for which appellant 
was convicted. 
There has been an evolution 
in the la1v relative to the requirement 
that prosecuters make available 
to the defense all evidence known 
by the prosecuter which is material 
to any case. The Supreme Court 
initially held, in a series of 
decisions represented by Napue 
.'.'2_. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 3 L.Ed 
2rid 1217, 79 S. Ct. 1173, that 
the knowing use of false tes tirnony 
by a prose cuter who, after the 
testimony is known to be false 
permits it to go uncorrected is 
a violation of the due process 
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of the law (1959). This holding 
was an extention of a rule first 
enunciated in Mooney vs. Holohan, 
294 U.S. 103 in which the Supreme 
Court reversed for a failure to 
disclose exculpatory evidence: 
"The same result obtains when 
the State, although not soliciting 
false evidence, allows it to go 
uncorrected when it appears." 
' 
The next significant statement 
and expansion of this rule is 
found in Brady vs. Maryland , 
373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed. 2nd 215, 
83 S. Ct. 1194 in which the Supreme 
Court said: 
We now hold that the supression 
of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates 
due process where the evidence 
is material either to guilt 
or punishment, irrespective 
of the good faith or bad faith 
of the prosecution. 
Society wins not only when 
the guilty are convicted but 
when criminal trials are fair; 
our system of the administration 
of justice suffers when any - . 
accused is treated unfairly(emphasi: 
added) . 
This rule has been enunciated a 
by several State Courts, represenati" e 
of which is the Supreme Court p 
of Missouri in the case of State 
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vs. Thompson, 396 S.W. 2d 297 (1965) 
Tu which the Missouri Court said: 
"Various courts have held 
that the suppression of (or 
failure to disclose) evidence 
in the possession or control 
of the prosecution which is 
favorable to defendant and 
which might be pursuasive 
to a jury, constitues such 
a fundamental unfairness 
as to invalidate a conviction 
(emphasis added). 
This line of cases is particularly 
significant in this prosecution because, 
as the court instructed the jury in 
Instruction No. 20: 
' 
You are instructed that the 
charge of rape, is in its 
nature, a most heinous one, 
likely to create a strong 
prejudice against the accused. 
It is a charge easy to make 
and hard to disprove. 
On this account you should 
bear in mind the difficulty 
of defenditig against such 
a charge and consider most 
carefully all of the evidence 
and instructions given in 
making up your verdict. 
The extrodinarily fragmentary 
and tenuous nature of the circumstantial 
evidence adduced by the State to 
prove the corpus delicti of the 
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crime of rape in this case accents 
the need to put all relevant cviJ2ncc 
before the jury.-- As stated ahove 
there was no direct evidence that ' 
anybody had raped Pauline Link, 
let alone the defendant, and the 
only evidence to indicate that 
proposition was the finding by 
Dr. Stevenson of live sperm in 
the vagina of the prosecuting 
witness on the morning of December 
5 together with her denial that 
she had had sexual intercourse 
within the 24 hour immediately 
preceeding that examination. There 
is no question that the sperm was 
found, but prior to trial the 
defense uncovered evidence which 
would have permitted either corroboratio: 
or contradiction of Miss Link's 
statement that she had not had 
intercourse within the 24 hours 
immediately proceeding the morning 
of December 5. In light of the 
difficulty of defending against I 
the charge of rape as expressed 
by the court in its Instruction 
No. 20, the placement of any impediment 
to a full investigation of the 
factual allegations set forth to 
substantiate the charge, whether 
made by the investigating officers, 
the prosecution, or the court, 
constitutes such a fundamental 
unfairness in the administration 
of justice that it runs afoul of 
the thrust of the language of the 
Supreme Court of the United States 
in Brady vs. Maryland, supra. 
In this case there is no 
allegation of affirmative misconduct 
by the prosecuting attorneys, 
but what is alleged is an adoption 
by them, and a refusal to cooperate 
in the supression of a statement 
made by the investigating officer 
to the prosecuting witness which 
made it impossible for the defense 
to investigate the credibility 
of her key statement in this case. 
When the court failed to remedy 
that default, the defendant was 
denied the very substance of an 
appropriate defense to this charge 
which denied him fundamental due 
process of the law. 
More-particularly in point 
on pre-trial supression of testimony 
is the case of Gregory vs. United 
States, 369 F.2nd 185 where the 
court of appeals for the circuit 
stated: 
The prosecutor's advice to 
prospective witnesses that 
they not speak to anyone 
about the case unless he 
was present was an improper 
and unreasonable interference 
with defendants equal right 
to interview witnesses. 
The court of appeals reversed 
Gregory's conviction by reason 
of that interference. Of further 
significance is the case of Howard 
~ The State, 244 N.E.2nd 127 
_r:;r:;_ 
wherein the Supreme Court of 
Indiana reversed a conviction 
of murder in the first degree, 
and on appeal held that the trial 
court's ruling denying defense 
motions for discovery constituted 
reversable error. Prior to trial 
the defendant had petitioned 
the court for permission to take 
depositions of two police officers 
whose names had been given by 
the prosecuter as prospective 
witnesses. Emphasizing that 
a criminal prosecution is not 
a game but rather a system designed 
to discover the truth, the Indiana 
Court reversed the judgment of 
conviction because in the opinion 
of the court the defendant was 
entitled to examine before trial 
individuals whom the prosecuter 
had indicated would be witnesses 
for the State. 
The holdings of those two 
cases are strong pursuasive 
authority, particularly given 
the context and facts of the 
instant case, that appellants 
conviction should be reversed 
by reason of an unwarranted 
and unfair interference with 
his right to investigate the 
facts upon which the State's 
case rests. To have denied 
him access to the fundamantal 
facts of the case constitutes 
such a denial of due process 
that it is a patent violation 
of the rights secured to him 
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by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United 
States. 
VI 
THE INTRODUCTION OF CLOTHING 
OF THE PROSECUTRIX ALLEGEDLY WORN 
ON THE EVENING OF THE CRB1E WAS 
REVERS.ALBE ERROR. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 6-10 
were comprised of a pair of white 
panties, trousers, coat, shirt, 
and a scarf alleged to have been 
worn by the prosecutrix on the 
evening of December 4, 1970, and 
the morning of December 5, 1970. 
When introduced at the trial the 
white panties bore dirt smudges 
and blood stains, and the outer 
garments were disheveled, dirty, 
and dusty. Miss Link testified 
that as to Exhibit 8 the coat, 
No. 9 the shirt, No. 10 the scarf, 
No. 6 the panties, and No. 7 the 
trousers, they were "clean" when 
she put them on and not in the 
same condition when introduced 
at the trial (T. 105-108). As to 
the coat and pants the defense 
levied no objections. As to the 
shirt, scarf and panties, the 
defense objected to the admissibility 
of the evidence on the ground of 
immaterialily. Though the exact 
foundation of the allegation of 
immateriality was not stated, that 
objection was taken by reason of 
the fact that with the chain of 
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evidence established at the time 
of marking and submission into 
evidence the prosecution had not 
established that the change in 
the clothing had been effected 
during the course of a crime. 
The prosecution failed to establish 
that relationship satisfactorily 
through almost the whole trial. 
Finally the defense asked relevant 
questions with reference to the 
matter commencing at T. 433 and 
continuing through T. 439. That 
colloquy comprised both of direct 
and cross-examination follows: 
BY MR. BARBER: 
Q Now with reference, Pauline, 
to State's Exhibit No. 6, 
what was -- when was the last 
time you examined these panties 
in detail in the area of the 
crotch prior to getting to 
the hospital? 
A I didn't. 
Q You didn't? So, would 
it be safe to say, then, 
particularly with reference 
to these red stains, that 
it is not necessarily so that 
those happened after midnight 
of that 
A Yes, it did happen after. 
Q And how do you knmv that? 
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A Because I wasn't flowing 
hard enough that that would 
happen. 
Q But when was the last 
time you had checked? 
A 0:1, I don't remember. 
Q l1ight it have been early 
that morning? 
A No. 
Q No? But you don't --
you said you didn't recall 
when you changed, so how 
do you know it wasn't early 
in the morning? 
A It was probably in the 
evening when I put them on. 
Q It was probably in the 
evening? Do you recall having 
done that? 
A Yes. 
Q When was that? 
A In the evening. 
Q Well, by "in the evening, II - -
A Around five, six, seven. 
Q Five, six, seven? 
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You said that those pants 
remained in your home for 
some period between the time 
you were in the hospital and 
the time that the officer 
picked them up, is that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Where were they during 
that period? 
A I don't know. 
Q Would it be safe to assume 
from the course -- general 
course of events in your home 
that those pants would have 
been in a laundry area? · · 
A No. 
Q No? You would put those 
in a drawer or something? 
A They were in a paper bag. 
Q They were in a paper bag? 
And where did the paper bag 
come from? 
A From the hospital. 
Q And how -- how do you 
know those pants were in that 
paper bag all that time? 
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A Well, who is going to take 
them out? 
Q Oh, I really don't know, 
Miss Link, but let me ask 
you the questions. 
You said that you didn't 
sec them when they were brought 
back from the hospital, isn't 
that correct? 
A That's right. 
Q And the next time you saw 
them was when Detective Stauffer 
came by? 
A Yes. 
Q And do you know -- but 
you said when you first saw 
them after they got home, 
they were in a paper bag? 
A Yes. 
Q Of course, these other 
articles of clothing were 
in the paper bag too, weren't 
they? (Indicating.) 
A No. 
Q No? How big was the paper 
bag? 
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A What paper bag? 
Q The paper bag that the 
clothes were in? 
A All of them? 
Q Well, that's what I asked 
you, were they all in a paper 
bag? 
A I said I didn't even think 
they were in a bag at all. 
Q Where were the clothes 
when you first saw them? 
A They were sitting on a 
table. 
Q This table here? (In di ca ting.) 
A No. 
Q Which table? 
A A table in my house. 
Q Were they in any container 
at that time? 
A I don't remember them being 
in anything. 
Q You don't. Do you know 
whether they were returned 
to your home in a container? 
A No, I don't know that 
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either. 
Q So do you know whether 
or not they were in a container 
from the time that you got 
them home and the time you 
first saw them on the table? 
A I don' t knmv. 
Q They may not have been 
in a container or they may 
have been in a container? 
A That's right. 
Q Do you know which part 
of the house they were kept 
in? 
A I think I smv them down 
in the basement. 
Q Down in the basement? 
What portion of the basement? 
Was it in a recreation, rumpus 
room or a laundry room or 
garage, or what? 
A It's sort of a T.V. room. 
Q A T.V. room? 
Were they in a container there? 
A I don't remember of them 
being in one. 
Q Ever? 
A No. 
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Q They were just loose? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. Do you know 
whether they were ever in 
any other area of your home 
during that period? 
A I don't know. 
Q You don't know. Do you 
know whether they were delivered 
to your home in a vehicle? 
A In a 
Q In a vehicle. 
A Oh, I don't know how they 
were gotten home. 
Q All right. That's the 
question. So you don't know 
whether they got to your 
home in a vehicle, right? 
A No, I don't. I assume 
they were. 
Q. You assume that. Now, 
Miss Link, when you were in 
the hospital, how long were 
you in the hospital before 
you had a bath? 
A One day. 
Q That would have been the 
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next day? 
A Saturday sometime. 
Q DurinB that day, did you 
recall experiencing any 
itching or rash of any sort 
on any part of your body? 
A No. 
Q And particularly with 
reference to your buttocks 
and your thighs in the back, 
did you notice any itching 
of any kind there? 
A No. 
q Or did you notice any 
abrasions of any sort on 
that area of the body? 
A No, I don't remember. 
Q No pain of any sort? 
A I don't remember any. 
Q You are not conscious 
of anything at all with 
reference to that area that 
would be out of the ordinary? 
A Well, if so, I don't 
remember. 
Q All right. Do you know 
when you put on this pair 
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of panties that's here as 
State's Exhibit 6? (Indicating.) 
A .r told you that evening, 
Friday evening, and you just 
asked me. 
Q I must have missed that. 
I thought~ I asked you when 
you checked to determine they 
weren't stained and you said 
that. 
A That's when I put them 
on. 
Q You put them on at the 
same time. And I presume they 
had been freshly laundered 
prior to that? 
A .. Yes 
Q You don't know what happened 
after you took them off to the 
time you saw them at home? 
A They were sitting in a 
paper bag.That's all I know. 
Q Just one further brief 
question. You state that the 
last time that you had intercourse 1 
was approximately a week prior 
to December 5th, is that 
correct? 
A That's right. 
Q Was that with your steady 
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boyfriend? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you have intercourse 
reqularly with Cory or 
MR. BANKS: Objection --
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. BANKS: - - Your Honor. 
Q And you are absolutely 
certain that you did not 
have intercourse within two 
days of December 5th? 
A Within a week. 
MR BARBER: No further questions 
at this time. 
RECROSS EXAfIINATION 
BY MR. BANKS: 
Q Let's take these items 
one at a time. (Indicating.) 
This one you saw in the home 
was where and in what, if 
anything. (Indicating.) 
A In a paper bag. 
Q All right. How about your 
coat? 
A I don't remember of seeing 
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any of the others in a bag. 
Q In a bag. So that's all 
the other clothing that you 
are referring to. But the 
pants were in a paper bag, 
is that correct? 
A Right. 
Q Now, at the hospital, did 
you see the blood in the same 
condition on this coat as 
it is now? (Indicating.) 
A Yes. It was all there. 
Is that what you mean? 
Q Yes. And did you see the 
blood on it at that time? 
A Yes. Yes. 
Q And did you see these pants 
in this condition at the 
hospital? (Indicating.) 
A Yes. 
Q And I'll ask you if these 
items that were turned over 
to the police, to Officer 
Stauffer, were substantially 
in the same condition as at 
the time you removed them 
at the hospital? 
A Yes. 
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--
llR. BANKS: That's all. 
rzE REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY l!R. BARBER: 
Q By "substantially" the 
same, Miss Link, what do 
you mean? 
A They were the same. 
Q They looked about the 
same? --
A Well, they hadn't been 
touched. I don't know how 
they could be any different. 
Q Well, I'm not asking you 
that. How close did you 
examine that pair of --strike 
that. You removed your clothes 
in the hospital yourself? 
A I don't know. You've 
asked me that. 
Q You don't know? You don't 
know whether you removed 
your clothes, but you do 
know you looked at them 
closely? 
A Yes. I could see the 
blood on them. 
Q Well, what were you doing 
at the time you looked at 
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them closely? 
A I just looked at them. 
I couldn't help but see it. 
Q While you were --
A While I was taking them 
off or while they were being 
taken off. 
Q But you don't know which 
one that was? 
A No, I don't. 
Q So while you were either 
taking your clothes off or 
someone else was taking them 
off, you looked at them very 
closely? 
A Yes. I could see the blood. 
Q You could see some blood? 
I notice that you do not say 
that you could see any other 
kinds of stains on them. 
Is that because you didn't 
see any particular other stains 
on them at that point? 
A No, I don't know what you 
are saying. 
Q You say you saw blood 
stains. Is that about what 
you saw when you looked at 
the pants was just the pants 
-70-
with the blood stains? 
A Ily pants don't have any 
blood on them. lly levis, is 
that what you are talking 
about? 
Q No. I'm talking about 
your panties. 
A I took them off. 
Q You took them off? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And you said you saw the 
bloodstains on· them didn't 
you? 
A Oh, they were the same 
way. They are not --
Q No that's not what I am 
asking. Did you see the blood 
stains on them at that time? 
A I don't remember. 
Q Did you see any other kind 
of stains of them? 
A They were really dirty. 
Q They were really dirty? 
Did you see any stains on 
them? 
A I didn't examine them that 
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close. 
Q You noticed they were dirty, 
but you are not sure they 
had the blood stains on them. 
A I don't know how else they 
could have gotten on them. 
Q I don't either. But the 
point is, you saw them, saw 
that they were dirty, but 
you are not sure what they 
were dirty with, is that a 
fair --
A They were just dirty. 
Q Okay. They were dirty. 
And without knowing whether 
the blood stains were on them 
in the hospital, you were 
able to testify that they 
were the same then as they 
are now? (Indicating.) 
A Sure. 
MR. BARBER~ No further questions. 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence adopted by the Supreme . 
Court of the State of Utah, effective 
July 1, 1971 reads as follows: 
DISCRETION OF JUDGE TO EXCLUDE 
ADMISSABLE EVIDENCE 
Except as in these rules 
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otherwise pro/ided, the judge 
may in his ~scretion exclude 
evidence if he finds that 
its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the risk that 
its admission will (a) necessitate 
undue consumption of time 
or (b) create substantial 
danger of undue prejudice 
or of confusing the issues 
or of misleading the jury, 
or (c) unfairely and harmfully 
surprising a party who has 
not had reasonable opportunity 
to anticipate that such evidence 
would be afforded. 
A note, found in the published 
copy of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
after the foregoing contains the 
following language: 
This applies to frequently 
arising situations where the 
trial may get out of hand 
by the injection of collateral 
issues having only slight 
probative value in which would 
tend to confuse the jury, 
and or have illegitimate 
emotional appeal. ... this 
represents the sort of thing 
that the judge does everyday 
in actual practice and which 
is sanctioned here, in the 
assurance that the results 
of rare and harmful abusive 
discretion will be readily 
corrected on appeal. It is 
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a rule of necessity. Its 
sanction cannot be escaped 
if we are to have orderly 
antl efficient trial proceetlure. 
The colloquy of counsel with 
Miss Link set forth above demonstrates 
conclusively that the introduction 
of this evidence was at the same 
time so prejudicial to the defe~tlant 
by reason of the condition of the 
clothing as it appeared at trial, 
and the failure of the State to 
establish the probability that 
it's condition had not been materially 
changed between the time it was 
removed from Miss Link at the 
hospital and the time of trial, 
that its very introduction denied 
defendant due process of the law. 
Significant matters about the 
clothing which prejudiced the 
defendant were the fact that the 
shirt worn by the prosecuting 
witness was dirty and dusty when 
introduced at trial, when the 
witness had not testified that 
she had ever removed her coat 
so that the dirty and tattered 
condition of the clothing would 
have occurred during the course 
of the attack upon her on December 
5, and the dusty and soiled condition 
of her panties, which if materially 
different at trial than they were 
when removed from her at the hospital 
would permit the jury to infer 
that her outer garments were 
removed while she was raped. The 
condition of th~t clothing was, 
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id th the exception of the obliquely 
relevant testimony of Dr. Stevenson, 
the only real evidence corroborating 
the proposition that Miss Link 
was undressed and raped in the 
shop of Craig Sims on the early 
T:lorning of December 5. Unless 
her panties had been dirty and 
dusty, which would be a normal 
result of her having been attacked 
sexually on the floor of a shop, 
that presumption would be in considerable 
doubt. 
With reference to Miss Link's 
panties> the language at T. 441 
is indicative of her lack of sureness 
about the condition of the clothing 
at the time she removed them at 
the hospital. When asked whether 
they had blood stains on them she 
said "I don't remember" . When 
asked whether she saw any other 
kinds of stains on them she said 
"They .were really dirty". When 
asked whether she saw any stains 
she said " I don't examine them 
that close". Then the following 
sequence occurred: 
Q You notice they were dirty, 
but you are not sure that they 
had blood stains on them. 
A I don't know hmv else could 
they have gotten on them. 
Q I don't know either but 
the point is you saw them, 
saw that they were dirty, 
- 7 r:, -
but you are not sure 'vhat 
they were dirty with, is that 
a fair -
A They were just dirty. 
This shows an extreme lack 
of definition in the answers and 
indicates that she was merely 
making assumptions about their 
condition on the morning of· December 
5 derived from their appearance 
sometime later when they appeared 
at trial. When it is taken into 
account that the clothing was 
loose in the basement of her home 
for sometime, that they had been 
transported in the vehicle very 
likely with no container about 
them, that any number of people 
may have handled them and that 
they may have been in any number 
of "dirty" places in the home 
in the interim, to accept her 
word as being sufficient to 
establish that the clothes as 
they appeared at trial were the 
same as they were on December 
5 is ridiculous. 
The fact of it is that the 
trial judge violated both the 
spirit and the letter of Rule 
45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
when he admitted these items, 
particularly the panties. There 
can be no question that this 
evidence "created substantial 
danger of undue prejudice ... and 
misleading the ·jury" by reason 
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of the high likelihood that its 
condition materially altered 
bct1vccn December 5 of 1970 and 
October of 1971, when there were 
no protective measures taken to 
see that the clothes were not 
further soiled or their condition 
otherwise materially altered. 
The case law concerning "chain 
of evidence" is not altogether 
useful by reason of the fact that 
so often it turns on particular 
facts present in only one case. 
The general rule appears to be 
that some change in the condition 
of physical evidence between its 
seizure and trial is permitted, 
particularly when the changes do 
not go to the essence of the items 
introduced or the particular 
features thereof which are relevant 
to the items to be proved by their 
use. See e.g., Duke vs. State, 
58 So.2d 764 (1952) ,Davidson vs. 
State, 69 S.2nd 757 and State 
vs . Co ope r , 9 2 A. 2nd 7 8 6 ( 19 5 2) 
hmvever, some courts have stated 
a much more restrictive rule on 
chain of evidence, requiring the 
State to explain the custody 
chronologically from the time of 
seizure until the time of introduction 
at trial, and with the result that 
the failure to establish a 100 
percent complete chain of custody 
has heen fatal to the introduction 
of the evidence. See e.g., McElfresh 
vs. Commonwealth, 243 S.1V.2nd 947 
[Supreme Court of Kentucky, 1951). 
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Although precedents may well 
recommend the adoption by this 
court of the last stated posture, 
such a posture is not necessary 
to require the exclusion of the 
evidence in this case. The ambit 
of Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, should be defined by an 
analysis of the concept of cir-
cumstantial evidence. Circum-
stantial evidence was defined 
as follows in People v~ Kennedy, 
32 N.Y. 141: 
Circumstantial evidence consists 
in reasoning from facts which 
are known or proved to 
es tab 1 ish such as are conjectured 
to exist, but the process 
is fatally vicious if the 
circumstances from which 
we seek to deduce the 
conclusi(,n depends itself 
upon conjecture. 
See also People v. Jackson, 
8 N.Y. 2d 939 255 App. Div. 688. 
The Supreme Court of California 
has said: "Circumstantial evidence 
is an insurance to be drawn from 
fact proved." People v.· Royal, 
150 P.2d 812. See also State v. 
Murdock, 34 S.E. 2d S.E. 2d 69 
225 N.C. 224. State v~ Butler, 
94 N.E. 2d 457, Sniegowski v. Reese, 
61 N.E. 2d 272, 36 Ill. App. 255. 
In defining the measures which 
are required to. be taken in 
protecting against the arrival at 
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unjustified conclusions by inferance 
from proven fact the Supreme Court of 
Arizona has said: 
Before a material object may be 
admitted in evidence it must 
be shmvn that there has been 
no substantial change in 
conditions since the time in 
issue. Witt Ice and Gas 
Company v. Bedway, 23 P.2d 952, 
72 Aria. 152. 
Perhaps the best statement of the Rule 
is found in 32 C.J.S. Evidence Section 
607 wherein the following language is 
found: 
In order that an article may be 
introduced, it must be 
satisfactorily identified and 
it must also be shown to the 
satisfaction of the Court that 
no such substantial change in the 
article e.xhib.i ted has taken -
place such as to render the 
evidence misleading but it is 
not necessary that the article 
be identically the same as at 
the time in controversy. 
This language dictates the following 
conclusion based upon hypothetical 
facts: 
That if the purpose for which an 
Arrow Shirt is introduced into 
evidence is to prove that at the 
time in question an individual 
was wearing an Arrow Shirt, the 
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condition of that shirt 
is immaterial. 
However, where, as here it is 
the relative amount of ~oil and 
dirt upon clothing which is the 
most significant aspect thereof 
toward the proof or disproof 
of the inference sought to be 
established by the State, and 
where that soil and dirt was of 
a common variety, not unique to 
any given location, and where 
those clothes were, according 
to the testimony of Miss Link, 
placed uncovered and unprotected 
for a long period of time in the 
basement of her home where that 
kind of common dirt and soil was 
undoubtedly present, the obvious 
prejudice is too great to permit 
its placement before the jury 
without some reasonable explanation. 
The witness's vague answers to 
questions about the condition 
of the clothing when they were 
removed from her at the hospital, 
her inability to throw any light 
upon the care taken in the custody 
of the items while they were in 
her home, and her obvious use . 
of frail logic rather than observation 
to explain the locus and extent 
of the stains on the clothing 
when they were introduced at trial, 
works a positive and a substantial 
injustice on the defendant because 
of the obvious implication that 
if the clothes were that dirty 
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1vlien they were at the hospital 
on December 5, they got dirty during 
the course of a rape, when if a 
good portion of that dirt or soil 
was placed there after that time 
the relative cleanliness of the 
clothes at the hospital would work 
an opposite inference to which 
the defendant is entitled unless 
reasonable evidence is adduced 
to show that there was not such 
a significant change in that interim. 
v 
INTRODUCTION OF THE TESTIMONY OF 
ROBERT YOCKEY WAS REVERABLE ERROR 
BECAUSE: 
A. THE TESTIMONY IS SO INCREDIBLE 
AND YET SO PREJUDICIAL THAT ITS 
USE BY THE PROSECUTION EXCEDED 
PERMISSIBLE PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
AND DENIED DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS 
OF THE LAW. 
The particular attention of 
this court is directed to the 
testimony of Robert Allen Yockey 
commencing At T. 94 running through 
T. 129. Appellant asserts that 
the very content of this testimony 
~s so obviously fabricated that 
it's falsity and incredulity was, 
or ought to have been known by 
the prosecution prior to the trial 
with the result that its very use 
tainted the criminal processes 
of this case to the point that 
due process of the law was violated. 
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This is particularly true in this 
case because of the relative 
weakness of the evidence that 
Pauline Link was raped on the 
morning of December 5 and that 
the defendant committed that crime. 
In many cases, there would be 
a sufficiency of corroborating 
and direct evidence to establish 
the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt which would 
render the use of such testimony 
non-prejudicial, but when the 
evidence is as weak as it is here, 
the use of such testimony if 
believed in any degree whatever 
by the jury, would weight the 
scales sufficiently on the side 
of guilt to make it material 
in the extreme and therefore highly 
prejudicial. 
The Supreme Court of the United 
States, together with the Federal 
Courts of Appeal in deciding this 
issue as presented on Writs of 
Habeas Corpus by defendants convicted 
in State Courts, have enunciated 
the following basic rule: 
The due process of law which 
is protected from State and 
Federal infringement by the 
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, 
respectively, is denied by . 
a conviction of crime following 
a trial in which perjured 
testimony on a material point, 
is knowingly used against 
the accused, at least where 
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it appears that the accused 
suffered prejudice by virtue 
of the use of such testimony. 
Annotation: Due Process-Perjured 
Testimony, 2 L.Ed.2nd 1575. 
The cases cited in this 
annotation all contain statements 
of that general rule: Mooney 
vs. Holohan 294 U.S. 103, 79 L.Ed 
791, 55 S.Ct.317 U.S. 213, 87 
L.Ed 214, 63 S.Ct. 177, White 
vs. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 89 L.Ed. 
1348, 65 S.Ct.978, Alcorta vs. 
Texas, 355 U.S 282 L.Ed. 2nd 9, 
~ Ct. 103 and Hysler vs. 
Florida 315 U.S. 411, 86 L. Ed. 
932, 62 S.Ct. 688. In all these 
cases the Supreme Court of the 
United States reversed convictions 
based upon it's finding that the 
foregoing rule was violated. 
Of particular significance 
is Alcorta vs. Texas, supra in 
which Alcorta was convicted of 
having killed one Kastiloeja upon 
provication provided when he caught 
Kastiloeja kissing his wife in 
a parked car. At trial Kastiloeja 
had testified that he was not 
in love with the petitioners wife, 
that she was not in love with 
him and that he had had no dates 
With her. Subsequently, at a 
hearing on habeas corpus, he 
testified that he had had sexual 
intercourse with the petitioner's 
Wife on five or six occasions 
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within a relatively brief period 
before her death and that the 
prosecutor had known those f~cts 
prior to the trial. He stated 
that the prosecutor had told him 
that he if were asked questions 
relating to his having had intercours: 
with the petitioner's wife he 
should answer them truthfully, 
but told him not to volunteer 
any such information if the questjons 
were not directly put to him. 
The question was whether or not 
that testimony would have been 
material to Alcorta's defense 
that he killed Kastiloeja in a 
surge of passion for which he 
had adequate cause. The Supreme 
Court reversed, finding that 
had Kastiloeja not perjured his 
testimony about the relationship 
with petitioner's wife the jury 
likely would have believed his 
defense of passion, and the 
f ai 1 ure of the St ate to af fi rmati vcly 
adduce the nature of that relationshi; 
in the testimony of Kastiloeja 
was a violation of the due process 
of the laws secured to Alcorta 
by the Fourteenth knendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
The respondent will no doubt 
cite two elements of the rule 
as stated above as being absent 
in this case in urging the court 
to disregard this assignment of 
error; those being the assertion 
that the appel~ant has not proven 
that the testimony of Yockey was 
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perjured nor that the prosecuting 
attorney had the requisite knowledge 
of the perjured nature of the 
testimony required to bring its 
use within the proscripti6ns of 
the rule stated above. Such a 
finding was adopted by the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the 
case of Ryles vs. United States 
198 F. 2d 199, in which the Court 
found that despite a direct conflict 
in the evidence there was insufficient 
evidence to establish the fact 
that the testimony of narcotics 
agents relevant to the case was 
perjured. The Court also cited 
the failure of the petitioner 
to establish that even if the 
testimony was perjured, it was 
knowingly, willfully, and intentionally 
used. Such holdings ·a.re found in 
Hubbard vs. Jacques, 95 F.supp.894,Price 
vs. Sloap, 178 F.2d 273, cert denied 
339 U.S. 985, 94 L.Ed.1388, 70 
S.Ct. 1006, and McGuinn vs. United 
States, 239 F 2d 449, cert denied 
353 U.S. 942, 1 L.Ed. 2d 762,77 
S.Ct. 818. In the later case the 
court of appeals refused to invalidate 
the conviction because the evidence 
of the perjured nature of the 
testimony adduced by the defendant 
was related to the "not unusual 
situation where witnesses recollections 
differ as to immaterial matters." 
Petitioner asserts that the 
Lestimony of Robert Yockey in this 
case did not relate to the "not 
unusual situation where witnesses 
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recollections differ as to material 
matte:s" but was simply a fabrication 
of evidence, which the witness 
may or may not have adequate motive 
to state, but which related to 
the very essence of the issues 
upon which appellant was found 
guilty. 
This entire assignment of 
error is based on appellants 
assertion that the quality of 
the testimony of this witness 
was so egregious and obviously 
false, that in his discretion, 
the District Attorney knew or 
ought to have known that its use 
would be sufficiently material 
and relevant in the· trial of this 
issue to deny the defendant due 
process of the law, and therefore 
the use of that testimony is 
sufficient grounds to invalidat~ 
appellant's convic~ion. Albeit 
that the general rule is that 
the mere use of perjured testimony 
is not sufficient to violate the 
provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but that such a denial 
occurs only when it appears that 
such tainted testimony is knowing 
and intentionally used by the 
prosecution, the writer finds 
considerable room to question 
that statement of the rule because 
of its obvious over-emphasis on 
the intent of the prosecutor, 
which when one places himself 
in the shoes of the defendant 
convicted upon·perjured testimony, 
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is of less than no comfort to him. 
In a free country a defendant 
ought to be secured freedom from 
conviction for crime on perjured 
testimony in any case. Such a 
fundamental evil should be subject 
to remedy whether or not the perjured 
testimony is knowingly used, or 
whether or not the perjured nature 
of the testimony itself is discovered 
before or after trial. Several 
cases relying on the requirement 
of knowledge of the prose..cutor 
of the perjured nature of the 
testimony are found in the annotation 
cite~ first above,Tompsett vs. 
Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, cert denied 
TI:4lJ. S . 8 6 9 -, 8 9 · L. Ed. 14 2 4 , 6 5 
S.CL916-,Kmvalak vs. Frisbie, 
93 F. Supp 777, In Re Sawyer's 
Petition, 229 F.2d 10, cert denied 
351 U.S. 966, 100 L.Ed.1486, 76 
S.Ct. 1025, and Story vs. Burford, 
178 F.2d 911, cert denied 338 U.S. 
951, 94 L.Ed.587, 70 S.Ct.482. 
The last case concerned a claim 
by one convicted in State Court 
that he had been denied due process 
by virtue of the fact that the 
prosecution knowingly used perjured 
testimony to secure the conviction. 
His assertion was rejected because 
the court found that the petitioner 
himself did not have any evidence 
showing that the prosecuting authorities 
or the presiding judge knew that 
the witnesses were perjuring themselves. 
A better statement of the rule 
is found in Jones vs. Kentucky, 
97 F.2ci 335, in which a \Vrit of 
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Habeas Corpus was granted where 
it appeared that the conviction 
had been obtained by the use of 
perjured testimony notwithstanding 
that it was not shown that the 
state prosecuting officers knew 
the testimony to have been false. 
The Court stated that the fundarnenta! 
concept of justice which lie at 
the base of our ci vi 1 and political 
institutions must condemn as a 
travesty a conviction upon perjured 
testimony if later its falseness 
is discovered, and the State in 
such a case is therefore required 
to afford a correctional judicial 
process to remedy the alleged 
wrong if constitutional rights 
are not to be impaired. Certain 
cases, in extending the rule 
stated in Jones, seem to have 
implied that constructive knowledge 
of the falsety of testimony used 
in a trial may be sufficient to 
violate the rule. In Wilde vs. 
Oklahoma, 187 F.2d 409 the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
that the use of false testimony 
will constitute a denial of due 
process where the prosecuting 
officers uknew, or ... had reason 
to believe that the testimony 
offered at trial was false or 
perjured." 
The foregoing is precisely 
what appellant is asserting here. 
The testimony of Jay D. Edmonds, 
.Assistant District Attorney, 
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commencing at Volume VI of the 
Trial Transcript Page 135, that 
upon discovering that Yockey had 
stated that he had heard Sims make 
statements about his implication 
in this crime, he took Yockey to 
the Office of the District Attorney 
and there inquired of him about 
his testimony, shows a remarkable 
lack of probing by the District 
Attorney's Office to determine 
the truth or falsity of the proffered 
testimony. Integrity in the administration 
of justice ought to impose a duty 
upon prosecuting officers to make 
reasonable inquiry, at least a 
cross-examination of a witness 
whose testimony appears to be 
related to a crime, to test that 
testimony and provide facts upon 
which to make an independent 
finding of its probable validity. 
In this case no such an interrogation 
occurred, nor was there any effort 
made to corroborate the testimony 
with others who may have been 
involved. That entire duty fell 
to the defense which was in a far 
inferior position to come to reasonable 
conclusions. 
Particularly relevant to this 
issue is the case of Mesarosh vs. 
United States, 352 U.S. 1, 11.Ed., 
2d 1, 77 S.Ct.l, (1956) in which the 
Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed the conviction of defendant 
for violation of the Smith Act 
\•:here, on argument at the Supreme 
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Court the Soliciter General of 
the United States, though he did 
not allege that the testimony 
upon which petitioner had been 
convicted was necessarily perjurious 
simply indicated to the Court 
1 
that there was a finding that 
other testimony given at other 
times and places by the witness 
Mazzei was inconsistent and u.ncorrobor 
The Supreme Court said: 
Either this Court or the 
District Court should accept 
the statements of the Soliciter 
General as indicating the 
unreliability of this government 
witness. The question of 
whether his untruthfulness 
in these other proceedings 
constituted perjury or was 
caused by a psychiatric conditi~ 
can make no material difference. 
Whichever explanation might 
be found to be correct in 
this regard, Mazzei's credibili~ 
has been wholly discredited 
by the disclosure of the 
Soliciter General. No other 
conclusion is possible. The 
dianity of the United States 
b • 
Government will not permit 
the conviction of any person 
on tainted testimony. This 
conviction is tainted and 
there can be other just result 
than to accort petitioners 
a new trial. 
nn -
The integrity of judicial 
process in Utah should not be held 
to be less sacred than those same 
processes in the Federal Government. 
Furthermore, the fair administration 
of the criminal Law should not 
be left to the prosecutor's decision 
\vhether to acknowledge the "taint" 
on his case or not. A reading 
of the testimony of Robert Allen 
Yockey will demonstrate that his 
testimony was tainted, and that 
the holding of the Supreme Court 
that once that is determined there 
is no alternative but to reverse 
the conviction for a new trial 
ought to be adopted by this Court, 
as a demonstration of the intolerance 
of this body for tainted judicial 
processes in the State of Utah. 
VI 
REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT 
TO PERMIT THE TESTIMONY OF JACK 
BRADY CONCERNING THE CHARACTER 
OF THE PROSECUTRIX WAS REVERSABLE 
ERROR. 
At Page 357 of the Transcript 
of the Trial, the defense made 
a proffer in chambers of testimony 
proposed to be introduced by one 
Jack Brady. That proffer indicated 
that Mr. Brady, if permitted to 
testify, would testify that on 
or about October 30 he met the 
complaining witness at a party, 
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that they talked for a brief 
period after which they went to his 
car in which the prosecutrix 
permitted him to take considerable 
sexual liberty with her. He 
would further have testified 
that he could have engaged in 
sexual intercourse with her at 
that time but that he did not for 
reasons unrelated to her consent 
or refusal. He would have testified 
that t·liss Link gave him her phone numbe 
and invited him to call her at any tiJ11e 
He would have said that he was certa~ 
that had he called her he could have 
engaged in sexual intercourse with her 
with no difficulty. He would have 
further said that he was the one who 
gave Mr. Sims Miss Link's number and 
recommended that should he call her 
he would undoubtedly be able to engage 
in sexual intercourse with her. 
At that time the defense stated 
that by reason of Niss Link's testim~ 
that Mr. Sims had asked her to have 
sexual intercourse with him and that 
she refused, there arose an implicatio~ 
that his frustration at that refusal 
caused him to engage in the stratagem 
by which he took her to his shop, 
ass aul te d her, and had sexual intercou 
with her while she was unconscious. 
At the conclusion of the legal argu~ef 
about this prof fer proper the trial 
court refused the defense request 
to introduce this testimony. 
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!Vhigmore states the majority 
ru] e as follows: 
Ordinarily, the woman's chaste 
character is not in issue on 
a charge of rape (though her 
consent is material), and her 
acts of unchastity with other 
men may be admissable to evidence 
probability of consent on this 
occasion. 
Other than the exception designed 
to permit evidence of the character 
of the prosecuting witness as it 
relates to the issue of consent where 
that issue is raised by the facts 
of the case, the Courts have generally 
held that the reputation of the 
prosecuting witness for chastity 
is inadrnissable as irrelevant. That 
holding is the law in the State of 
Utah as set forth Court in State 
vs. Scott 55 U. 553, 118 P. 860; 
In view that the defendant-
denied that he was with the 
prosecutrix on the night in 
question and denied that he 
had had sexual intercourse with 
her then or at any time, we 
cannot conceive how such evidence 
had any relevancy in this case, 
except perhaps to affect the 
creditibility of the prosecutrix. 
It was however, not offered 
for that purpose, and it is 
not contended here that it 
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shoul<l have been admitted fur 
that purpose. Where the defendant 
admits the sexual act, but 
contends that the prosecutrix 
consented thereto, and where, 
as he re, she is of laHful ao e 
such evidence is relevant a~d, 
material upon the question of 
consent. While it is true that 
even a prostitute may refuse 
consent to the sexual act, yet, 
in contemplation of law, a 
lewd woman is much more likely 
to consent to such an act than 
a chaste woman would be; hence 
evidence that the prosecutrix 
was generally reputed to be 
unchaste is relevant for the 
purpose just stated. (Cases 
cited) 
The facts of this case, however, 
introduce a slightly different twist 
both into the facts and the law upon 
which the holding in scott is based, 
by reason of the fact that they 
present a factual situation in which 
evidence of the prosecuting witnesses 
chastity is relevant directly on 
the issue of her creditibility as 
well as to permit the defendant to 
rebut an obvious presumption introduced 
by the prosecution; to-wit, that 
it may have been the refusal of 
the prosecuting witness to consent 
to have intercourse with the defendant 
that occasioned the commission of 
the crime. The appellant testified 
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:it the trial as follows: 
Q We drove up Millcreek Canyon 
we got just past Log Haven, 
we met some kids backing down 
in a pickup truck. They said 
the roads were too slick to 
get up any further. We drove 
back down the canyon a ways, 
and pulled over and stopped 
for a few minutes. 
Q What happened while you were 
stopped if anything? 
A Well, first I got out and 
went to the restroom -- or 
something similar. I got back 
in the truck. 
Q In the truck? 
A Car, excuse me. I got back 
in the car and Lina told me 
that she was really glad that 
I had called her. She was glad 
that she had come and she commented 
that she was balling this other 
guy regularly and would feel 
sort of guilty. I really 
didn't know quite what to 
say. I told her I understood. 
She put her arms around me 
and kissed me. I kissed 
her back and suggested that 
we go down the canyon to 
a friends --down out of 
the canyon to a friend's 
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house. _There_was usually 
something going on. It was 
the weekend so we drove down 
the canyon and we went to 
this friends of mine house. 
(T.103-104). 
He said that after he left the 
party they drove around in search 
of Miss Link's boyfriend. After 
failing to find him at any of 
the locations they checked, the 
defendant said Niss Link made 
the following statement. 
We drove up the street and 
she said she just wanted 
to drive by and see if it 
--his car was there, if 
he wasn't there then should 
could have a good time and 
wouldn't have a guilty conscious 
about it. 
Appellant asserts that the 
logical thrust of this statement 
of the prosecuting witness was 
that by reason of the fact that 
she refused to have intercourse 
with Sims because of her boyfriend, 
after they made an unsuccessful 
search for him she would not mind 
engaging in sexual intercourse 
with him. The likelihood that 
a man would physically assault 
and molest a woman while she was 
unconscious who had made clear 
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to him that she would not object 
to havtng intercourse with him 
is preposterous. It is her credibility 
both as to her denial that she 
ever consented to have intercourse 
11 ith Sims, and the likelihood 
demonstrated by Brady's testimony 
tho. t her s ta temen t of implying 
consent to Sims Has true that 
makes Brady's testimony relevant. 
It can only be assumed that if 
she would consent to have sexual 
intercourse with one person, the 
likelihood is greater that she 
woul<l consent to have intercourse 
with another, that is to quote 
the Utah Supreme Court, "a lewd 
woman is much more likely to 
consent to such an act than a 
chaste woman would be". 
Of further significance is 
the theory put forward by the 
appellant in argument to the jury 
that Miss Link had permitted the 
inference that Sims had assaulted 
her to arise, not really believing 
that he could be convicted on 
the evidence on such a crime, 
by reason of the fact that she 
\vanted to hide from the pub 1 ic 
and her parents and fact that 
~he had regularly been having 
intercourse with her boyfriend. 
With reference to a similar proposition 
the Supreme Court of Utah in 
~ , supra, stated as follows: 
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It was theory of counsel 
for the defendant however, 
that the prosecutrix in 
this case had had intercourse 
with the individual heretofore 
referred to; (not the defendant) 
that she tried, but was 
unable to see such individual, 
and that for that reason 
and in order to shield 
herself in view of her supposed 
pregnancy she wrongfully 
charged the defendant with 
the offense. No doubt if 
such were the case the 
defendant would have the 
right to prove by her on 
cross-examination, if he 
could, that such was the 
purpose in lodging the 
1 
t 
a 
t 
Cj 
complaint against the defendant, CIPJ 
and, in order to establish rev 
the fact he no doubt would and 
be permitted to prove that upo 
she had had intercourse ci tJ 
with the individual aforesaid. or c 
Under such circumstances for 
it is always proper to show. opin 
the motives of the prosecuting 
witness, and if such be 
the fact that she is wrongfull 
accusing' the defendant either 
to shield herself or shield 
another. 
This holding is squarely. 
in point, particularly where it 
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is seen that the testimony of 
llrndy did not relate to an independent 
an unrelated act of sexual intercourse 
1.i th another, but merely the 
fact that she had consented, after 
a very brief rneeting, to have 
intercourse with Brady. The damage 
to the prosecuting witness and 
the danger of a trial of collateral 
is~ues, those being the main 
foundations for the exclusionary 
rule, clearly do not apply in 
this case, with the result that 
the testimony should have been 
admitted. The failure of the 
trial court to do so is reversable 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated the 
appellant prays that this Court 
reverse the verdict of the jury 
and the judgment of conviction 
upon the offense of rape, and 
either dismiss the information 
or direct that the case be remanded 
for new trial consisted with the 
opinion of this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
James N. Barber 
455 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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